This paper addresses the problem of broadcasting messages in a reliable and totally ordered manner when processes and channels may crash and recover, or crash and never recover. We present a suite of specifications of reliable and total order broadcast primitives and we describe algorithms that implement those specifications. Our approach is modular and incremental. It is modular in the sense that the properties of broadcast primitives are first given separately and then composed: this provides a comprehensive design space for broadcast semantics. It is incremental in the sense that a broadcast algorithm implementing a given specification is obtained by transforming an algorithm that implements a weaker specification: this gives an automatic way to improve the resilience of broadcast primitives. We derive specific reliable and total order broadcast algorithms and we discuss their performance and optimality.
Introduction
Broadcasts primitives facilitate the development of distributed applications. We consider in this paper two of the most important of such primitives: reliable broadcast and total order broadcast.
Both allow processes to broadcast messages with some reliability guarantees. Roughly speaking, reliable broadcast ensures that all processes agree on the set of messages they deliver, while total order broadcast ensures that all processes agree on the sequence of messages they deliver.
In short, a total order broadcast is a reliable broadcast where processes deliver messages in the same order. This paper addresses the problem of devising algorithms 2 that implement reliable to crash and recover impacts the actual definition of the very notion of process correctness, and consequently requires to revisit the specifications of broadcast primitives, e.g., in comparison with the specifications initially defined for a crash-stop model [15] . As we show in this paper, several meaningful specifications are possible for every property of a crash-recovery resilient broadcast. In fact, in the context of a crash-recovery model, every property of a given kind (validity, agreement, integrity and total order) might come in different flavours, according to whether:
1. We only restrict the behaviour of the processes that do not crash: we end up with the weakest properties, denoted by V.1, A.1, I.1, and TO.1. For instance, agreement here (A.1) would not preclude the situation where a process p i delivers a message before crashing and no other process ever delivers that message, even if p i recovers and never crashes again.
2. We also restrict the behaviour of the processes that recover -and remain up for sufficiently long: we end up with stronger properties, denoted by V.2, A.2, I.2, and TO.2. Typically, agreement here (A.2) would prevent the situation above, but would not preclude the situation where a process p i delivers a message before permanently crashing and no other process ever delivers that message.
3. We restrict the behaviour of all processes: we end up with the strongest properties, denoted by V. 3, A.3, I.3, and TO.3 . Agreement here (A.3) would ensure that if any process p i delivers a message, every correct would deliver the message, even if p i crashes just after delivering the message and never recovers. This paper defines these properties in a precise manner and describes how they can be combined in various ways to obtain meaningful specifications of crash-recovery resilient broadcast primitives (reliable and total order broadcast). We first point out some interesting relationships between the specifications and we propose transformer algorithms that build upon a broadcast primitive that satisfies a given specification (e.g., V.1, A.1, I.1, and TO.1 ) to implement a broadcast primitive that satisfies a stronger specification (e.g., V.2, A.2, I.2, and TO.2 ). Our unit of broadcast transformation is the individual specification. Transformers for reliable broadcast, together with transformers for total order broadcast, are instances of the same generic algorithm. This genericity enables us to factor out some fundamental differences between reliable and total order broadcast in a crash-recovery model, while capturing their similarities.
This promotes algorithm layering, e.g., along the lines of [16] .
We give algorithms that implement our different specifications in an incremental manner.
We start by considering crash-stop resilient broadcast algorithms, namely the reliable broadcast algorithm of [15] and the total order broadcast algorithm of [7] . We show how to slightly improve these algorithms to satisfy the weakest of our crash-recovery resilient specifications (V.1, A.1, I.1, TO.1). We then discuss the algorithms that result from applying our transformers to implement stronger specifications. We point out simple techniques to optimise these algorithms and we give corresponding lower bounds (in terms of forced logs). Practical performance measures are given to depict the actual differences between algorithms that implement different specifications.
Contributions. This paper aims at giving a comprehensive study of crash-recovery resilient broadcast specifications and possible implementations.
• We draw a sharp line between the specifications and the implementations of broadcast primitives. In particular, we define various forms of specifications for reliable broadcast and total order broadcast. To our knowledge, this is the first time such a suite of specifications is given in a crash-recovery model.
• We present a systematic way of strengthening the resilience of crash-recovery resilient broadcast primitives. We do so using generic transformer algorithms that do not make any assumptions on the underlying broadcast algorithms (as long as they implement their specifications).
• We give specific crash-recovery resilient broadcast algorithms that we obtain from transforming crash-stop resilient broadcast algorithms, namely the algorithms of [15] and [7] . Interestingly, our resulting algorithms have the same number of communication steps than the original crash-stop algorithms in nice runs, i.e., runs where processes are up and messages are not lost: these are the most frequent runs in practice. In other words, we point out the very fact that the price to pay for moving to a crash-recovery model is in terms of forced logs.
• We discuss simple techniques to optimise our algorithms in terms of forced logs, and we give some general lower bound results that match our algorithms. Our experimental study helps quantify the performance difference between algorithms implementing different specifications.
Roadmap. The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes our crash-recovery model. Section 3 defines the specifications of our crash-recovery resilient broadcast primitives. Section 4 presents our transformer algorithms. Section 5 focuses on specific algorithms and discuss their performance from an analytical as well as an experimental point of view. Section 6 discusses related work and draws some concluding remarks. Due to a lack of space and given that they are close to those of reliable broadcast, the correctness proofs of our total order broadcast transformers and algorithms are given in optional Appendix A.
Model

Processes
We consider a set of processes Π = {p 1 , p 2 , ..., p n }. At any given time, a process is either up or down. When it is up, a process progresses at its own speed behaving according to its specification (i.e., it correctly executes its program). Note that we do not make here any assumption on the relative speed of processes. While being up, a process can fail by crashing; it then stops executing its program and becomes down. A process that is down can later recover; it then becomes up again and restarts by executing a recovery procedure. The occurrence of a crash (resp. recovery) event makes a process transit from up to down (resp. from down to up). We say that a process p i is unstable if it crashes and recovers infinitely many times. We define an always-up process as a process that never crashes. We say that a process p i is correct if there is a time after which the process is permanently up. 4 A process is faulty if it is not correct, i.e., either eventually always-down or unstable. We assume that once p i recovers, p i is reset to the state initialised.
A process is equipped with two local memories: a volatile memory and a stable storage. The primitives store and retrieve allow a process that is up to access its stable storage. When it crashes, a process loses the content of its volatile memory; the content of its stable storage is however not affected by the crash and can be retrieved by the process upon recovery. We assume the presence of a discrete global clock whose range ticks τ is the set of natural numbers.
This clock is used to simplify presentation and not to introduce time synchrony, since processes cannot access the global clock.
Link Properties
Processes exchange information and synchronise by sending and receiving messages through fair-lossy channels. We assume the existence of a bidirectional channel between every pair of processes. We assume that every message m includes the following fields: the identity of its sender, denoted sender(m), and a local identification number, denoted id(m). These fields make every message unique. Channels can lose or drop messages and there is no upper bound on message transmission delays. We assume the same channel definition given in [1] The last two properties are sometimes called, respectively, finite duplication and weak loss, e.g., in [19] . They reflect the usefulness of the communication channel. Without these properties, any interesting distributed problem would be trivially impossible to solve. By introducing the notion of correct process into the fair loss property, we define the conditions under which a message is delivered to its recipient process. Indeed, the delivery of a message requires the recipient process to be running at the time the channel attempts to deliver it, and therefore depends on the failure pattern occurring in the execution. The fair loss property indicates that a message can be lost, either because the channel may not attempt to deliver the message or because the recipient process may be down when the channel attempts to deliver the message to it. In both cases, the channel is said to commit an omission failure.
Retransmission Module
We introduce here a retransmission module that encapsulates retransmissions issues to deal with temporary crashes of communication channels. This module is a basic block underlying our algorithms (see Section 5) . The primitives of the retransmission module (s-send and sreceive) preserve the no creation and finite duplication properties of the underlying channels, and ensures the following validity property:
Validity: Let p i be any process that s-sends a message m to a process p j , and then p i does not crash. If p j is correct, then p j eventually s-receives m. Figure 1 gives the algorithm of the retransmission module. All messages that need to be retransmitted are put in the variable xmitmsg with their destination in the set dst (line 5). Messages in xmitmsg are erased once all recipients have acknowledged m, otherwise they are always retransmitted (lines 18-21). by the fair loss properties of the channels, p j receives and then s-receives m: a contradiction.
For case (b), since process p i keeps on sending m to p j , there is a time after which p i sends m to p j and none of them crash afterwards. As for case (a), by the fair loss property of the channels, p j eventually receives m, then s-receives m: a contradiction. ✷
Broadcast Specifications
Informally, a reliable broadcast primitive ensures three properties [15] : (validity) every message broadcast by a correct process is delivered by the process; (agreement) processes agree on the set of messages they deliver; and (integrity) messages are not delivered more than once and cannot be delivered out of thin air. Roughly speaking, a total order broadcast is a reliable broadcast which also ensures the following property: (total order ) processes deliver messages in the same order.
Reliable Broadcast
In a traditional crash-stop model [15] , reliable broadcast was more precisely defined through two distinct primitives broadcast and deliver that satisfy the following properties:
Validity: If a correct process broadcasts a message m, then it eventually delivers m.
Agreement:
If a correct process delivers a message m, then every correct process eventually delivers m.
Integrity: For any message m, every correct process delivers m at most once, and only if m was previously broadcast by sender(m).
Transposing these properties in a crash-recovery model can be done in various ways. Indeed, one could obtain several meaningful properties according to whether or not we consider the behaviour of processes that crash (and possibly recover), and whether or not we consider the behaviour of faulty processes -those which crash and do not recover, or keep crashing and recovering. In the following, we consider each property of reliable broadcast separately, and we
give three meaningful variants of these properties in a crash-recovery model. 5 We first present three variants of these properties: 
Total Order Broadcast
Total order broadcast is a primitive that requires processes to deliver the messages in the same order. This guarantee ensures that every correct process has the same view of the system. More precisely, a total order broadcast primitive ensures validity, agreement and integrity, plus the following property:
Total order: Let m and m be any two messages. Let p i and p j be any two processes that deliver m. If p i delivers m before m then p j also delivers m before m.
As for reliable broadcast, defining a total order property in a crash-recovery model can be done 
Relationships
Before discussing the implementability of these specifications, we point out some preliminary results and relationships among our properties. We show that properties I. 
Broadcast Transformations
This section first gives an overview of our notion of transformer algorithm, and then focuses on specific reliable broadcast and total order broadcast transformers. Correctness proofs of our total order broadcast transformers can be found in optional Appendix A (these are very similar to the correctness proofs of our reliable broadcast transformers).
Overview
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Receive Send and assume S is a stronger specification than S, e.g., if S is RB, then S is W URB, URB or
SU RB.
A transformer T S→S is an algorithm that transforms any broadcast algorithm that implements S into a broadcast algorithm that implements S . We denote by A the initial broadcast algorithm that implements S (associated with primitives Broadcast and Deliver ), and A the broadcast algorithm that implements S , resulting from the transformation (associated with primitives Broadcast' and Deliver' ). Figure 2 describes the architecture and the interaction between the layers that we consider in a transformer T S→S . As described in the left part of Figure 2 , a transformer is made up of four parts:
1. A Broadcast' primitive (R'-Broadcast, resp. TO'-Broadcast) based on the original Broadcast primitive (R-Broadcast, resp. TO-Broadcast) 2. A Deliver' primitive (R'-Deliver, resp. TO'-Deliver) based on the original Deliver primitive (R-Deliver, resp. TO-Deliver) 3 . A processing procedure that is invoked when a process Delivers a message and before it
Delivers' the message.
4.
A recovery procedure that is invoked when a process recovers from a crash. Each transformer has in addition an initialisation procedure that initialises its variables.
A transformer for reliable broadcast is similar to the corresponding transformer for total order broadcast except that specific processing and recovery procedures are plugged in. We present in the following subsections the transformers:
and T UT OB→SU T OB . 7
Reliable Broadcast
We describe here the transformers T RB→URB and T URB→SU RB , and we state and prove their correctness. We say that a process p i R'-Broadcasts a message m once p i returns from the invocation of R'-Broadcast. As in [1] , we say that a process p i R'-Delivers a message m when p i stores m into an adequate stable storage location. The primitive R-Deliver is implemented as a callback and we make the assumption that when R-Delivering a message m, the algorithm A stores m into an adequate stable storage location.
Transformer T RB→URB . The algorithm T RB→URB is presented in Figure 4 , it works as follows for a given process p i . First, to ensure property V.2, p i stores all messages that it R-Broadcast, Process p 4 will never R'-Deliver m since p 4 will never R-Deliver m (with the specification of reliable broadcast, once a process crashes, it does not have to R-Deliver m). Therefore, some process, e.g., p 1 , has to s-send m to every process. Finally, the recovery procedure is invoked when p i recovers from a crash. The recovery procedure is composed of the following three phases: As for T RB→URB , when p i recovers, p i R-Broadcasts again all messages it R'-Broadcast previously in case p i was not able to invoke the R-Broadcast primitive before crashing; this allows every correct process to R-Deliver and to acknowledge every message. In the recovery procedure, p i s-sends acknowledgements of all R-Delivered messages to all processes in case a process would wait for an acknowledgement of m before R'-Delivering m. In contrast to T RB→URB , when p i recovers, p i cannot directly R'-Deliver the messages that it R-Delivered but did not R'-Deliver, this would violate property A.3. Thanks to our modular approach, the very same processing procedure than in T RB→URB can be reused here. Proof. Follows directly from lemmata 8, 9 and 10. ✷
Total Order Broadcast
We present here total order broadcast transformers T T OB→UT OB and T UT OB→SU T OB . As shown in Figure 6 , the structure of the total order transformers presented in this subsection is identical to those of reliable broadcast. The only differences are (i) the underlying primitive invoked, (ii) the modified processing and recovery procedures, and (iii) variable renaming, e.g., the r' delivered variable is replaced by the k th batch of messages to' delivered. Otherwise, the transformer algorithms remain exactly the same. We say that a process p i TO'-Broadcasts a message m once p i returns from the invocation of TO'-Broadcast. We say that p i TO'-Delivers m when p i performs a forced log of m into an adequate stable storage location. 8 We assume that there is a deterministic rule by which p i TO-Delivers or TO'-Delivers a batch of messages. As for reliable broadcast, the primitive TO-Deliver is implemented as a callback and we assume that when TO-Delivering, the algorithm A stores the batch of messages into an adequate stable storage location. 
atomically deliver all messages in to' delivered(nextBatch) in some deterministic order 10: 
Algorithms: Optimisations and Lower Bounds
In the previous section, we did not consider specific algorithms but we have shown how to transform any given algorithm that satisfies a given specification into an algorithm that satisfies a stronger specification. We focus here on specific algorithms. We show how we build crash-recovery resilient broadcast algorithms based on actual algorithms from the crash-stop model (namely, the algorithms of [15] and [7] ) and our transformers. We then show how to optimise these algorithms in terms of forced logs and messages using a systematic approach.
We then describe for each type of algorithm its analytical performance in terms of forced logs and communication steps, and then we give some interesting lower bounds. Finally, we give some experimental performance results of the implementation of those algorithms in a local area network.
Reliable Broadcast
We first show that the crash-stop reliable broadcast algorithm from [15] , when adapted to fair lossy channels, satisfies the properties V.1, A.1, I.1 of reliable broadcast. This algorithm can hence be used as a building block to devise stronger reliable broadcast algorithms, e.g., a crashrecovery uniform reliable broadcast algorithm. Figure 9 presents the reliable broadcast algorithm of [15] adapted to fair lossy channels, i.e, we basically replace the send (resp. receive) primitive by the s-send (resp. s-receive) primitive of the retransmission module. Uniform Reliable Broadcast. When applying transformer T RB→URB to the reliable broadcast of Figure 9 , we obtain a uniform reliable broadcast algorithm (V.2, A.2, I.2). Our transformation introduces however, (i) some redundant forced logs, and (ii) additional messages. Indeed, in T RB→URB (see Figure 4) , the variable r' delivered is redundant with the variable r delivered.
One of these forced logs is actually useless and can be eliminated if both layers (A and A ) are merged. In fact, when merging all layers into one, (i) numerous forced logs can be removed, and
(ii) numerous messages can be saved: both using a systematic approach. Intuitively, as shown in Figure 10 , the optimisation pattern is the following:
• The middle layer (e.g., layer A) is removed.
• The R-Broadcast (resp. R-Deliver) primitive is replaced by the s-send (resp. s-receive)
primitive.
• Thanks to our modular approach, the processing and recovery procedures from the transformers of Section 4.2 can be reused for these algorithms. Figure 11 gives an optimised algorithm for uniform reliable broadcast. A close look at the code in Figure 11 shows that it is exactly the same as the one from Figure 4 , except that the optimisation pattern has been applied, e.g., (a) the R-Broadcast primitive of Figure 4 is replaced with the s-send primitive in Figure 11 , (b) the R'-Broadcast primitive of Figure 4 is replaced with the R-Broadcast primitive in Figure 11 , and (c) the R-Deliver primitive disappears, since it now makes double usage with the s-receive primitive. Due to a lack of space and since the correctness proofs for this algorithm are similar to those of Figure 4 , we omit them here. Note that T RB→URB adds some messages, while T URB→SU RB does not. However, there is an added forced log compared to transformer T URB→SU RB : once a message m has been s-received, m is stored on stable storage. This forced log is mandatory since the optimised algorithm cannot rely anymore on the properties of uniform reliable broadcast but only on those of the retransmission module. If this forced log was not performed, the optimised algorithm would violate property A.3. Due to a lack of space and since the correctness proofs are similar to those of T URB→SU RB , we omit them here. Analytical Performance and Lower Bounds. Figure 13 depicts the communication and stable storage pattern of several reliable broadcast algorithms: (a) the reliable broadcast of [15] , (b) the uniform reliable broadcast of Figure 11 , and (c) the strongly uniform reliable broadcast of Figure 12 . Figure 13 considers nice runs, i.e., no process or link crashes. Figure 13 (a) shows that the reliable broadcast algorithm does not perform any forced logs. However, the uniform reliable broadcast algorithm performs one forced log when UR-Broadcasting a message m, and one forced log when UR-Delivering m. Finally, Figure 13 (c) shows that strongly uniform reliable broadcast has an additional forced log per process compared to uniform reliable broadcast, i.e., it performs a forced log when a process s-receives a message m for the first time. To ease reading, we did not draw all acknowledgements on the diagram; actually each process s-sends acknowledgements to every other process. Figure 13 (c) presents a scenario where the first two processes s-receive only two acknowledgements, and therefore cannot SUR-Deliver a message m.
On the opposite, the last three processes s-receive a majority of acknowledgements and indeed SUR-Deliver m.
One can trivially verify that, in nice runs and for any given message m reliable broadcast and uniform reliable broadcast require one communication step (resp. n c messages, where n c is the number of correct processes in the system) before m is delivered; while strongly uniform reliable broadcast needs two communication steps (resp. n 2 c + n c messages) to deliver m. These bounds are clearly minimal. We show now that our reliable broadcast algorithms are minimal in the number of logs they perform. We state for uniform reliable broadcast that if a process p i UR-Delivers a message m, then (i) p i has performed at least one forced log, and (ii) at least two forced logs have been performed in the system. Intuitively, as depicted in Figure 13 (b), when p i UR-Delivers m, p i must perform one forced log. However, the process that UR-Broadcasts must also perform another forced log; thus, at least two forced logs have been performed in the system.
Lemma 16. Consider any uniform reliable broadcast algorithm A, A cannot satisfy the properties of uniform reliable broadcast if A does not perform at least one forced log.
Proof. Assume by contradiction that there is a uniform reliable broadcast algorithm A that does not use stable storage. Let R(m, G faulty , G au ) be the set of runs of A such that (1) the only message broadcast is m; (2) processes in G faulty crash at the beginning and never recover; (3) processes in G au never crash; and (4) processes not in G au ∪ G faulty crash at the beginning, recover afterwards and never crash again. We show now that there exists disjoint subsets of processes G and G such that in some run r ∈ R(m, G, G ) some correct process UR-Delivers m more than once (which violates property A.2). In R(m, G, G ), we have faulty, always-up and eventually always-up processes. Let p i be any correct process. Consider two runs r 0 and r 1 , has kept track of m, therefore more than two forced logs in the system are required. In fact, n-n c +1 forced logs are mandatory (one per process), since we want to ensure that at least one correct process keeps track of m in case all processes crash. From lemma 17, we know that at least one forced log is mandatory before returning from UTO-Broadcast, it is also trivially the case for the primitive SUTO-Broadcast. The number of required forced logs performed in the system when a process SUTO-Delivers a message is therefore at least, n-n c +1+1 = n-n c +2. ✷
both belonging to R(m, G, G ). Since r 0 ∈ R(m, G, G ) and
Total Order Broadcast
First, we describe in Figure 14 a simple adaptation to fair lossy channels of the total order broadcast algorithm of [7] . The adapted algorithm satisfies the weakest of our total order broadcast specification (V.1, A.1, I.1, TO.1). The algorithm uses a series of consecutive consensus instances: each consensus instance being used to agree on a batch of messages. Each process differentiates consecutive instances by maintaining a local counter (k): each value of the counter corresponds to a specific consensus instance. We describe first the main data structure of the algorithm. A local set Received keeps track of all messages that needs to be decided, and another set TO Delivered keeps track of all TO-Delivered messages. Intuitively, the algorithm works as follows for a given process p i . When there are still messages to be TO-Delivered, i.e., Received-TO Delivered is not empty, process p i launches a consensus instance and waits for the decision value of consensus. Once p i s-receives the decision, p i removes all TO-Delivered messages from the batch and atomically deliver all the messages. Note that, once p i TO-Delivers m, then p i R-Broadcasts the delivered messages to every process in order to satisfy property A.1 of total order broadcast. We assume for the rest of the section that there is a majority of correct processes in the system. 9 Due to a lack of space, we give the correctness proofs of the algorithm of Figure 14 in optional Appendix A. 
wait until[receive(decide(k, msgSet k ))]
12:
TO Delivered k ← msgSet k -TO Delivered
13:
atomically deliver all messages in TO Delivered k in some deterministic order
{TO-Deliver m} 14:
TO Delivered ← TO Delivered ∪ TO Delivered k 15:
{Added from [7] } 16: upon recovery do 17: initialisation Figure 14 : Adaptation of the total order broadcast of [7] Uniform Total Order Broadcast. For total order broadcast algorithms, the optimisation pattern used for reliable broadcast is not sufficient and cannot be applied. Consider the following case depicted in Figure 15 We give here the intuition underlying the total order algorithms obtained after our transformations and optimisations. As shown by the example of Figure 15 , the optimisation pattern for reliable broadcast is different from the optimisation pattern for total order broadcast such that the following steps are imposed:
• An agreement phase is added to the retransmission module that replaces the middle layer our system model. Moreover, we assume here the reliable broadcast algorithm of [15] of Figure 9 .
(A).
• The process that coordinates the agreement phase saves one forced log by coupling the forced log of the agreement together with the forced log of the TO-Delivery. Figure 16 presents the optimisation pattern for total order broadcast. As described in Figure 16(c) , the agreement phase can be improved since performing one forced log for the agreement and one forced log for the TO-Delivery for every process is not mandatory. Instead, the coordinator process waits for n 2 process replies (other than itself), executes some steps, and then performs one forced log that couples the forced log required for the agreement and the forced log of the TO-Delivery. Every other process executes the usual scheme, one forced log for the agreement and one forced log for the TO-Delivery. The only difference with the uniform total order algorithm is in the way a process p i TODelivers messages, since p i needs to wait for a majority of processes to acknowledge a batch before TO-Delivering it.
Analytical Performance and Lower Bounds. Figure 17 depicts the communication and stable storage pattern, in nice runs, of several total order algorithms: (a) the total order broadcast of [7] , (b) the uniform total order broadcast and (c) the strongly uniform total order broadcast.
For presentation clarity, for both uniform broadcasts, Figures 17(b) and 17(c) depict only the agreement phase of process p 1 (in dots), and, in addition, Figure 17 (c) depicts the necessary acknowledgements for p 1 to SUTO-Deliver a message. Figure 17(a) shows that the total order broadcast algorithm does not perform any forced log. Figure 17 depicts, for uniform total order broadcast, that a process p i performs one forced log when UTO-Broadcasting a message m, and one forced log when UTO-Delivering m. Moreover, every process (except the coordinator of the agreement phase) performs an additional forced log for the agreement part. Strongly uniform total order broadcast has the same forced log pattern than uniform total order broadcast but performs the forced log of the TO-Delivery once a majority of processes has acknowledged the message. We state for uniform total order broadcast that, if a process p i UTO-Delivers a batch of messages, then (i) n 2 processes (including p i ) have performed one forced log, and (ii) 
Proof.
As shown in lemma 17, the process that UTO-Broadcasts must perform one forced log before returning from UTO-Broadcast. Assume that A solves uniform total order broadcast with n 2 -1 forced logs (one forced log per process). Suppose now that only the faulty ( n 2 -1) processes UTO-Deliver batch k, i.e., store batch k, crash and never recover. A correct process p i can then decide another value for batch k, i.e., the property TO.2 of A is violated. Therefore, if n 2 forced logs are performed (one forced log per process), at least one correct process has stored batch k since there at most n 2 faulty processes in the system. Indeed, at least Proof. Follows directly from lemma 21 and the fact that (a) one forced log is mandatory before returning from the primitive UTO-Broadcast, and (b) one forced log is mandatory for the coordinator of the agreement phase to UTO-Deliver a message. The minimal number of forced logs is performed if both previous forced logs are performed on the same correct process.
Then every other correct process (n c -1) performs two forced logs to UTO-Deliver m, we have then 2(n c -1)+1+1 = 2n c . ✷
Experimental Measures
We give some practical performance measurements of the algorithms that result from our transformations and optimisations. Our measurements reflect the impact of uniformity on the actual performance. These measurements were made on a LAN interconnected by Fast Ethernet (10MB/s) on a normal working day. The LAN consisted of 60 UltraSUN 10 (256Mb RAM, 9
Gb Harddisk) machines. All stations were running Solaris 2.7, and our implementation was running Solaris JVM (JDK 1.2.1, native threads, JIT). The effective message size was of 1Kb and the performance tests consider only cases where as many broadcasts as possible are executed.
When the number of processes increases, not only the number of recipients increases but also the number of broadcasting processes. These tests consider nice runs: no process or link crashes or is suspected to have crashed; these runs are the most frequent in practice, and are those for which algorithms are usually optimised. Figure 18 (a) summarises the results of the throughput measurements for each type of broadcast. Not surprisingly, our comparison depicts the fact that the more forced logs a broadcast contains (stronger specification), the worst the throughput is.
We give a more detailed view of the results in Figure 18 (b). To measure the overhead of uniformity, we have performed simple message sends between processes (until we reach the network capacity). This performance test measures the overhead of the retransmission module. We can also figure out that the existing reliable (resp. total order) broadcasts for the crash-stop model should have a performance that lies between the two top (resp. top and third) curves of Figure 18 (a) since we assume that known crash-stop implementations must be as efficient as our implementation. As conveyed by the measurement results, the performance of the reliable and total order broadcasts are by far better than the ones requiring stable storage (i.e., uniformity). Figure 18(b) is a bit misleading since it gives the impression that, for ten processes, the performance varies very little for broadcasts requiring forced logs. In fact, the scale is really large and the difference is quite noticeable; the measures are given in Figure 19 . Note that for both type of broadcast (reliable and total order), the uniform and strongly uniform versions are limited by the overhead time that it takes to store messages on stable storage. On our workstations, a forced log of the size of 1Kb took in average around 60 milliseconds. 10 On the other hand, the performance of the weakest broadcasts (without forced log) are limited by the overall performance of the network, which is conveyed by the quickly decreasing throughput. Again, due to the overhead of the stable storage, we notice that (i) reliable and total order broadcasts of the same type have performance close to each other, and (ii) the communication overhead is almost negligible. These results confirm that forced logs are a major overhead compared to communication steps and should be avoided as much as possible.
A solution to reduce the number of forced logs is to (reliable or total order) broadcast using batch of messages, i.e., only one forced log is performed for numerous messages. Note that it takes about half a second to perform a forced log of the size of 100 Kb which is equivalent to a rate of around 200 msg/sec. When fine-tuning our total order broadcast algorithms, we also found out that starting too many concurrent instances of consensus had a dramatic impact on the throughput. The best performance presented here are obtained with consecutive consensus instances at a rate of 1 or 2 consensus instance per second.
Concluding Remarks
We position here our specifications and algorithms with respect to related work.
Pragmatic approaches. Considerable work has been devoted to the implementation of broadcast primitives in practical system models where processes and channels may crash and recover, e.g., MTP [2] , RMP [23] , RBP [8] , TRAM [9] , RMTP [18] , and TMTP [24] . These broadcast algorithms do not aim at ensuring agreement in all possible situations [4] : if the sender of a message crashes, some processes might deliver the message whereas others might not. In fact, agreement is ensured on a best effort basis. The motivation of our work was precisely to figure out what it takes to always ensure agreement and total order in a practical crash-recovery system model.
Group communication systems like Isis [5, 21] , Transis [11] , or Totem [20] indirectly address the crash-recovery issue through a group membership abstraction. A process that crashes is excluded from the group and, when it recovers, it rejoins the group. Message delivery is synchronised with view changes through the notion of view synchrony and, roughly speaking, a process that leaves the group is exempted from delivering a message. In some sense, the guarantees offered by these systems are weaker than those corresponding to our specifications. For instance, we require that any correct process (even if it crashes and recovers) eventually delivers every message delivered by a correct process. On the other hand, view synchrony provides a notion of process exemption and a process that crashes is excluded from the group; hence, this process is not required to deliver every message. 11 One can circumvent the issue by assuming that a process that recovers changes its identity, but the problem is then postponed to the application level.
In short, many practitioners considered the problem of broadcasting messages in a crashrecovery system model. The algorithms proposed obviously ensure weaker guarantees than the specifications of our primitives, and finding out the actual specifications of the primitives implemented by those algorithms is an interesting issue. A complementary interesting question is how to devise crash-recovery broadcast algorithms that satisfy the specifications we defined in this paper, in a probabilistic manner, e.g., along the lines of [4, 12] .
Traditional specifications. The only comprehensive study of fault-tolerant broadcast specifications we are aware of is [15] . In [15] , the authors consider different kinds of process failures:
roughly speaking, crash failures model the definite halting of activities, omission failures model the skipping of messages, and Byzantine failures model arbitrary behaviour.
• that a process might commit in a crash-recovery model.
• The Byzantine failure model could be viewed as more general that the crash-recovery model and one would wonder whether the specifications and algorithms devised in the Byzantine model could be used in a crash-recovery model. Indeed, a process that crashes and recovers can obviously be viewed as a Byzantine process. However, in our crash-recovery resilient broadcast specifications, processes that crash and recover several times, yet that eventually remain up, are considered correct and are supposed to behave in a consistent manner, e.g., they are required to deliver messages that have been broadcast by correct processes. One cannot make any such requirement on any arbitrary Byzantine process. As a consequence, specifications of Byzantine resilient broadcast primitives simply do not fit a crash-recovery model.
Crash-recovery resilient total order broadcasts. We know of two broadcast algorithms that ensure strong reliability in a practical crash-recovery system model: the algorithm of [22] and the algorithm of [17] . Both ensure total order delivery of messages. In fact, these two algorithms ensure our strongly uniform total order broadcast specification (i.e., properties V.2, A.3, I.3 and TO.3). The algorithm of [22] is modular in the sense that it relies on an underlying consensus abstraction. The algorithm of [17] opens that abstraction for performance reasons.
In fact, the strongest of our total order algorithms that we obtain from our transformations and optimisations corresponds exactly to the algorithm of [17] .
A Optional Appendix: Total Order Broadcast Proofs
This appendix presents the correctness proofs for transformers T T OB→UT OB and T UT OB→SU T OB , and for the total order broadcast of [7] adapted to fair-lossy channels. Proof. Follows directly from lemmata 33, 34, 35 and 36. ✷
A.1 Transformer
